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LEGAL RIGHTS TO ACCESS 
INFORMATION ABOUT 
ANONYMOUS SPERM DONORS 
GIVEN TO CHILDREN OF 
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IN 
JOHNSON v. SUPERIOR COURT 
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 18, 2000, the Second District of the California 
Court of Appeals, Division Two, forever altered the artificial 
insemination industry.! On the surface, Johnson v. The Supe-
rior Court of Los Angeles County, et al., 2 balanced the rights 
of two parties to an artificial insemination procedure, those of 
the donor and those of the child created.3 However, a look be-
neath the surface of this decision yields a ruling that under-
mines the practice of protecting a sperm donor's anonymity, a 
practice that has been at the heart of the artificial insemina-
tion industry for years.4 
The Johnson case is particularly important to the artifi-
cial insemination industry because of the prevalence of the 
1 See Johnson v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, et aI., 80 Cal. App. 
4th 1050 (2000). 
2 See id. 
a See id. at 1056. 
• See Timothy J. McNulty, Dilemma is Born: Donor's Rights vs. Children's, Cm· 
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use of anonymous sperm donors in combating infertility. Ap-
proximately ten percent of married couples have difficulty 
conceiving children.5 For many of these couples, expensive and 
emotionally draining fertility procedures become part of the 
regular routine of attempting to achieve the dream of 
parenthood.6 Considering the extensive process, couples who 
participate in these procedures have high hopes that the chil-
dren born will be healthy. 
Typically, a heterosexual couple that chooses artificial in-
semination by an anonymous donor does so because the man 
suffers from a low sperm count, no sperm count, or has a 
known genetic disease or defect that he does not wish to pass 
on to his child.7 For a couple dealing with such issues, an 
anonymous sperm donor chosen from a sperm bank seems to 
be an ideal alternative.8 For example, the couple can choose a 
sperm donor whose features closely resemble that of the hus-
band, and participate in the pregnancy and the birth of the 
child together.9 Furthermore, once the child is born, the hus-
band becomes, by law, the natural father, and his name goes 
on the birth certificate. lO The couple can then raise the child 
as mother and father, left with the choice of whether to tell 
their child of his or her true biological origin. 11 
Due to the stigma that attaches to infertility, artificial in-
5 See. Donor Insemination Website (visited June 24, 2000) <http://www.ivf.coml 
donorins.html>. 
6 See Darryl E. Owens, Pain of Infertility, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, October 19, 
1999 [Reprinted at Promise to Deliver Website (visited June 29, 2000) 
<www.promisetodeliver.comlarticle_poi.htm».In1996. it was reported by the Centers 
for Disease Control that 20,600 children were conceived as the result of assisted re-
production techniques such as in vitro fertilization. This was a success rate of about 
22 percent for women that attempted such methods. Women who undergo these pro-
cedures are often so desperate to have a child that the expense of such treatments as 
in vitro fertilization, which can cost up to $15,000, is well worth the joy of having 
their own children. See id. 
7 See Artificial Insemination by Donor (A.I.D.) Website (visited June 24, 2000) 
<http://www.indiaparenting.comlfertility/datalfert08_03.shtml>. 
8 See Hollace S.W. Swanson, Donor Anonymity: Is it Still Necessary?, 27 COLUM. 
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 151, 153, 154 (1993). 
9 See Artificial Insemination by Donor (A.I.D.) Website, supra note 7. 
10 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000). 
11 See Sylvia Rubin, Family Secrets, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, January 15, 
1995 at 1. 
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semination is a highly sensitive subject.12· Anonymity of the 
sperm donor is usually important to both the recipient couples 
and the anonymous donors.13 Often, recipient couples intend 
to raise their children without acknowledging that they con-
ceived their children through artificial insemination.14 Fur-
thermore, anonymous donors wish to remain anonymous to 
avoid future confrontation by a child created with his sperm 
or that child's family.15 The artificial insemination process is 
therefore rooted in secrecy and anonymity.16 For example, a 
donor may choose whether his identity may be revealed by en-
tering into privacy agreements with the sperm bank to which 
he sells his sperm.17 Additionally, prior to artificial insemina-
tion, couples often sign agreements with sperm banks stating 
that the donors will remain anonymous, and are also given 
the option to maintain anonymity.1S 
In the Johnson case, six-year-old Brittany, a child con-
ceived through artificial insemination, was diagnosed with a 
genetically-transmitted kidney disease originating from the 
child's anonymous sperm donor.19 The case documents the par-
ents' struggle to obtain personal medical information regard-
ing the anonymous donor.2o It also illustrates the donor's 
fight, with the full support of the sperm bank, to maintain his 
anonymity at all costS.21 
This Note discusses the court's decision in Johnson v. Su-
12 See Kristin E. Koehler, Artificial Insemination: In the Child's Best Interest? 5 
ALB. L.J. SCI & TECH. 321, 335, 336 (1996). 
13 See id. See also McNulty, supra note 4, at 1. 
14 See Rubin, supra note 11, at 1. See also Susan Edelman, Anonymous Fathers; 
Sperm Bank Procedures Suggest Need for Regulation, THE RECORD, August 7, 1988 at 
AI. 
15 See Frank H. Boehm, How He Met His Son; A Sperm Donor's Experience 
Raises Questions that Must Be Answered by the Medical Community, THE TENNES-
SEAN, April 2, 1996 at A7. 
16 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 354. 
17 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 154. See also Rubin, supra note 11, at 1. Some 
sperm banks give donors the option of making their identities available to the chil-
dren created once the child reaches the age of 18. The California Sperm Bank, a 
sperm bank that offers this to donors, states that about 40 percent of the donors take 
this option. See id. 
18 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 154. 
19 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1055. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. at 1056. 
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perior Court of Los Angeles County, et al., 22 in which it held 
that children created through artificial insemination should 
be allowed access to information about their anonymous 
sperm donor fathers under limited circumstances.23 This Note 
will also explain the impact this decision will have on current 
sperm bank practices. Part II explains the background of the 
artificial insemination industry, as well as privacy rights dis-
cussed by the Johnson court.24 Part III will discuss the facts 
of the case and its procedural history.25 Part IV explains the 
court's analysis of this case and its decision.26 Part V critiques 
the court's analysis and discusses the possible effect the deci-
sion may have on the artificial insemination industry. 27 
II. BACKGROUND 
As the practice of artificial insemination grows in popu-
larity, questions about the industry's procedures and require-
ments for anonymity have increased.28 Few laws regulate the 
artificial insemination industry, causing the rights of parties 
in artificial insemination processes to remain unclear. 29 
A. THE SPERM BANK INDUSTRY 
Approximately 30,000 children per year are born as a re-
sult of the artificial insemination of sperm from an anony-
mous donor.3o While the procedure has been practiced for 
more than one hundred years, it has, in recent decades, be-
come an increasingly popular means of artificial reproduc-
tion.31 Artificial insemination by an anonymous donor is a 
process by which a woman, during ovulation, is inseminated 
with the sperm of an unknown male specifically selected by 
22 See id. at 1050. 
23 See id. at 1073. 
24 See infra notes 28-77 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 78-127 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 128-207 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 208-238 and accompanying text. 
26 See Sally Squires, Sperm Bank Boom Stirs Fear, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, February 
17, 1993 at N9. 
29 See id. 
30 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 152. 
31 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 322-323. 
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the recipient.32 This process has become so popular that, by 
the early 1990s, the sperm bank industry generated earnings 
of approximately $164 million per year.33 Each individual 
sperm bank may store the sperm of as many as 100,000 do-
nors.34 In choosing a sperm donor, a woman may choose from 
a variety of characteristics, from physical characteristics such 
as race, ethnicity and eye color, as well as personality traits, 
education and occupation.35 Approximately 400 commercial 
sperm banks in the United States facilitate this process.36 
Artificial insemination is less complicated and less expen-
sive than alternatives such as adoption because the artificial 
insemination procedure is relatively inexpensive and quickly 
performed.37 This process also allows a couple to avoid the ex-
tensive waiting periods for and shortages of adoptable babies 
that prospective adoptive parents must endure.3s Further-
more, with artificial insemination, the child is biologically the 
child of the woman impregnated and legally that of her 
husband.39 
Although artificial insemination is a relatively simple pro-
cess, many complications and problems may arise, one of 
which is the transfer of an unexpected genetic disease to the 
child conceived.40 To combat this problem, sperm banks that 
sell donor sperm are expected to rigorously test to ensure that 
the donor is physically healthy and lacking any genetic de-
fects.41 This extensive screening is important to avoid genetic 
32 See Karen M. Ginsberg, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial Insemina-
tion Industry in the United States, 30 MICH. J.L. REF. 823, 825-826 (1997). 
33 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 152. 
34 See Squires, supra note 28, at N9. 
35 See Jeff Stryker, Artificial Insemination Is More Widely Available-and More 
Problematic, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (From THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER), October 
12, 1993 at 8C. See also Swanson, supra note 8, at 152. 
36 See Ginsberg, supra note 32, at 826. 
37 See Average Cost of Artificial Insemination: $953, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Febru-
ary 17, 1992, at 9. 
as See Donor Insemination Website, supra note 5. 
39 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000). 
40 See Megan D. McIntyre, The Potential for Products Liability Actions when Arti-
ficial Insemination by an Anonymous Donor Produces Children with Genetic Defects, 
98 DICK. L. REV. 519, 524 (1993). 
41 See Uniform Parentage Act, CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7613 (West 2000). See also Av-
erage Cost of Artificial Insemination: $953, supra note 37, at 9. Under guidelines rec-
ommended by the American Fertility Society and the American Association of Tissue 
5
Bauman: Sperm Donation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
198 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
defects, a common reason why couples seek donor sperm.42 
However, if an anonymous donor passes a genetic disease or 
defect to a child conceived through artificial insemination, the 
dilemma becomes whose rights take priority: the rights of the 
donor to remain anonymous, or the rights of the parents of 
the artificially conceived child to obtain medical information 
about the unknown donor. 43 
B. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION LAws AND PRACTICES 
1. The Uniform Parentage Act 
In 1973, the Uniform Parentage Act remedied concerns 
regarding the legitimacy of children born through artificial in-
semination.44 The Act stated that when a husband and wife 
conceive a child using sperm that is not that of the husband's, 
and the husband consents in writing to the conception, the 
child born of that conception becomes that of the husband.45 
In addition to clarifying the identity of the legal father, the 
California Family Code also requires that the artificial insem-
ination take place under the supervision of a physician and a 
surgeon.46 Although the statute requires documentation re-
garding an insemination remains confidential within the med-
ical facility performing the procedure, such documentation, in-
cluding an anonymous donor's identity, may be open to 
inspection if a party demonstrates good cause to do soY 
2. Sperm Bank Procedures 
The sperm bank industry has a long-standing assertion 
that the best interests of all involved are served if every party 
Banks, potential donors must complete a full medical history, endure an extensive 
physical examination and genetic testing. Their sperm must then be tested for sexu-
ally transmitted diseases. Only after potential donor passes all of these tests should 
he be an acceptable donor. See id. 
42 See Ginsberg, supra note 32, at 823. 
43 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 329-330. 
44 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000). See also Swanson, supra note 8, at 
162. 
45 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000). 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
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maintains complete and total anonymity.48 Although this as-
sertion allegedly protects everyone, some critics believe that 
the industry's true interest lies in protecting the donor.49 The 
sperm bank industry strongly believes that any waiver in its 
anonymity policies would drastically reduce the number of 
those willing to donate sperm. 50 Although such a conclusion 
has not been substantiated,51 donors often desire anonymity 
because they do not want to be legally obligated to any chil-
dren created by the artificial insemination of their sperm.52 
Once a man is accepted as a sperm donor, the sperm bank 
views him as an investment, able to donate sperm as often as 
three times a week, at an average cost to the sperm bank of 
$50 per donation. 53 Currently, no legal restrictions limit the 
number of times a sperm bank may use an individual donor's 
sperm in artificial insemination, or the number of children 
that may be conceived.54 
Despite the "good cause" exception found in Section 7613, 
the general practice of many sperm banks is to destroy all 
documentation regarding the artificial insemination proce-
dures they perform. 55 This practice enables the sperm bank to 
maintain the anonymity of the donor, as well as that of recipi-
ent couples. 56 This practice is supported by the belief of sperm 
bank physicians that the donor screening process is so thor-
ough that virtually no risk exists of transmitting any diseases 
to the children conceived. 57 
This belief was tested in the mid:1980s, in the midst of 
the growing AIDS epidemic.58 Although only a few cases have 
documented women contracting AIDS from donor sperm,59 the 
scare prompted leading artificial insemination organizations, 
48 See McNulty, supra note 4, at 1. 
49 See id. 
50 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 171. 
51 See id. at 153, 171-172. 
62 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 333. 
63 see Average Cost of Artificial Insemination: $953, supra note 37, at 9. 
54 See Edelman, supra note 14, at AI. See also Stryker, supra note 35, at 8C. 
66 See McNulty, supra note 4, at 1. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See Pre·1986 AIDS Tests are Urged, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, March 15, 1995, 
at 6A 
69 See id. 
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such as the American Fertility Society and the American As-
sociation of Tissue Banks, to recommend ending the use of 
fresh sperm in inseminations and instituting strict guidelines 
for donor screening.60 However, these established guidelines 
that were never made mandatory.61 As a 'result, all sperm 
banks do not follow these guidelines.62 
In California, as in most of the country, relatively little 
case law addresses artificial insemination.63 The California 
cases that do concern artificial insemination have focused on 
issues such as paternity and visitation rights.64 For example, 
a California appellate court held that a woman may use an 
anonymous donor to conceive a child without fear that the do- . 
nor may establish paternity rights.65 Conversely, she will 
never be able to collect child support from the donor, since he 
is not legally considered the natural father of the child.66 
60 See Average Cost of Artificial Insemination: $953, supra note 37, at 9. The 
guidelines recommended by the American Fertility Society and the American Associa-
tion of Tissue Banks would screen out 80 to 85 percent of possible donors, rejecting 
them for such factors as age, sexual history and orientation, and drug use. See id. 
61 See Squires, supra note 28, at 9. 
62 See id. Cf Marlene Cimons, Fertility Doctor's Case Raises Ethical Concerns, 
THE Los ANGELES TlMES, February 13, 1992, at 30. Further concerns about the sperm 
bank industry were raised when the story broke about a doctor using his own sperm 
to artificially inseminate wome~, leading to the birth of approximately 75 children. 
See id. 
63 See Eric Lichtblau, Artificial Insemination Data Raises Fears, THE Los ANGE-
LES TlMES, August 10, 1988, at 14. 
64 See People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280 (1968) (stating that a man separated 
from his wife remains obligated to pay child support to wife for child conceived 
through artificial insemination with husband's consent). See also Curiale v. Reagan, 
222 Cal. App. 3d 1597 (1990), Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991), 
and West v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 59 Cal. App. 4th 302 (1997) (stat-
ing that a woman once in a lesbian relationship where her partner conceived a child 
through artificial insemination during the relationship, has no rights to an award of 
custody or visitation to the child). See also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 
386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986) (stating that a man selected and used as a as a sperm 
donor by two women who wish to raise a child together without the supervision or 
assistance of a physician, is the legal and natural father of the child conceived 
through this artificial insemination). 
65 See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 386. 
66 See id. 
8
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C. PRIVACY RIGHTS AND THEIR ApPLICATION TO DONOR 
ANONYMITY 
The right to privacy is protected by both the California 
and federal constitutions.67 Although the term "privacy" is not 
mentioned in the federal Constitution, several United States 
Supreme Court decisions established that a "zone of privacy" 
exists within the Bill of Rights extending to such areas as 
procreation and contraception.68 In addition to the protection 
interpreted in the Bill of Rights, the right to privacy con-
tained in the California Constitution extends to a person's 
medical information as well as that person's right to be "left 
alone."69 
In California, the test for determining a violation of per-
son's right to privacy was set forth in Hill v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Association.70 Under Hill, a violation will be 
found if a legally-protected privacy interest is present,71 the 
expectation of privacy is reasonable under the circum-
stances,72 and a serious invasion of privacy occurred.73 The 
right to privacy is balanced against any opposing interests, 
such as a compelling interest of the State.74 In Hill, the court 
concluded that mandatory drug testing did not violate a per-
son's constitutional right to privacy.75 The Johnson case deals 
with the novel issue of whether a sperm donor has a right to 
67 See CAL. CONST. ART. I. I. This amendment states, "All people are by nature free 
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defend-
ing life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." Id. 
68 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). The "zone of privacy" interpreted within the Bill of Rights stems 
from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. Id. See also Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts statute banning the dis-
tribution of contraceptives by non-physicians violated the Constitution). 
69 See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757 (1975) (holding that the right to privacy in-
cluded in the California Constitution included the right to be left alone). See also 
Heda v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App. 3d 525 (1990) (holding that medical records 
are protected by the Constitutional right to privacy). 
70 See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 7 Cal. 4th 1 (1994). 
71 See Hill, 7 Cal. 4th 1 at 39-40. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 37-38. 
75 See id. 
9
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privacy concerning the release of infonnation about his iden-
tity and medical information.76 This issue is complicated by 
the fact that the information is requested out of medical 
necessity. 77 
III. FACTUAL ANi::> PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1989, Ronald and Diane Johnson purchased sperm 
from the Cryobank spenn bank in Los Angeles, California.78 
The spenn was that of Donor 276, who, Cryobank verbally as-
sured the Johnsons, had undergone the proper genetic and 
disease testing. 79 Cryobank represented that the sperm was 
safe for use in artificial insemination.80 Prior to insemination, 
Cryobank required the Johnsons to sign a fonn agreement al-
lowing Cryobank to destroy all of its records and infonnation 
containing the identity of the spenn donor.81 After the John-
sons signed the agreement, Diane was inseminated, became 
pregnant, and subsequently gave birth to Brittany in 1989.82 
In 1995, at the age of six, Brittany was diagnosed with a 
genetic kidney disease known as Autosomal Dominant Poly-
cystic Kidney Disease (hereinafter "ADPKD").83 ADPKD is an 
inherited disease that affects many of the body's systems.54 It 
is characterized by a renal cyst that enlarges, and ultimately 
causes, in about half of those diagnosed, end-stage renal fail-
ure, usually occurring between the age of 50 and 60.85 Other 
problems such as cardiac abnormalities, cerebral aneurysm, 
and increased occurrences of cysts on other organs are also 
associated with this disease.86 According to a declaration sub-
mitted by one of Brittany's doctors, Brittany had already de-
76 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1056. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id at 1057. 
81 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1056. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See Jovan Milutinovic, M.D. Professor of Medicine Website, Clinical Character· 
istics of Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease (visited September 26, 2000) 
<http://www.musc.edulnephrology/JMl.htm>. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
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veloped cysts on her kidneys at the time of her diagnosis, in-
dicating that she had a highly advanced form of ADPKD.87 As 
neither Diane nor Ronald Johnson had a family history of 
ADPKD, and the disease can only be transmitted genetically, 
her physician quickly determined that the anonymous sperm 
donor was the likely carrier.88 
During Donor 276's screening process, Cryobank, through 
at least two of its employees, knew of Donor 276's family his-
tory of kidney disease.89 In 1986, during an interview with 
two Cryobank physicians, Donor 276 revealed that his mother 
and sister had both been diagnosed with kidney disease, mak-
ing his sperm at risk for transmitting the genetic kidney dis-
ease.90 Despite this knowledge, it was not until 1991 that Cry-
obank ceased to use Donor 276 as a sperm donor because of 
his family history and the risk his sperm carried kidney dis-
ease.91 By that time, Donor 276 had sold 320 sperm specimens 
to Cryobank, earning $11,200 from his donations.92 The num-
ber of women who were impregnated with the sperm of Donor 
276 is unknown.93 However, not until Donor 276 had been re-
moved from the list of Cryobank's donors did Cryobank inform 
Diane Johnson of the possibility that the sperm donor she 
used carried a genetic disease.94 
Upon learning this information, the Johnsons sued Cry-
obank for fraud, breach of contract, and professional negli-
gence.95 The thrust of the Johnsons' claim was that Cryobank 
failed to properly screen Donor 276 for genetic defects.96 Addi-
tionally, the Johnsons argued that Cryobank misrepresented 
the sperm to them as having been properly screened and free 
of any genetic disorder.97 
During the pre-trial discovery phase, the Johnsons re-
quested information from Cryobank that would have revealed 
87 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1056-1058. 
88 See id. at 1056-1057. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. at 1057. 
92 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1058. 
93 See id. at 1069-1070. 
94 See id. at 1057. 
95 See id. at 1056. 
96 See id. 
97 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1056. 
11
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the identity and medical history of Donor 276.9S Cryobank re-
fused to produce that information on the grounds that doing 
so would infringe on Donor 276's right to privacy.99 Addition-
ally, Cryobank alleged that such a disclosure would breach 
the anonymity agreements between all of the parties. 1OO When 
responses to discovery regarding Donor 276's identity and 
medical history were not forthcoming, the Johnsons moved to 
compel answers to those questions. IOI The Johnsons argued 
that such information was necessary considering the serious-
ness of Brittany's condition.102 Furthermore, the medical infor-
mation the sperm donor could provide was potentially deter-
minative of Brittany's medical treatment.I03 In support of 
their motion to compel, the Johnsons submitted declarations 
from two doctors stating that information regarding Donor 
276's identity was vital to determining Brittany's medical 
treatment and predicting the future developments of her dis-
ease. I04 The trial court originally granted the Johnson's mo-
tion, but later denied the motion to compel.105 
Soon thereafter, the Johnsons located an individual, John 
Doe, whom they believed to be Donor 276.106 Although he had 
not admitted to being the donor, the Johnsons served John 
Doe with deposition and trial subpoenas.1°7 Negotiations be-
gan between the Johnsons and John Doe regarding his testi-
mony.IOS The parties stipulated that John Doe's identity would 
not be revealed and his testimony would be limited, at deposi-
tion and at trial, to his association with Cryobank and his 
98 See id at 1057. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. at 1058. 
102 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1058. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. at 1058-1059. 
105 See id. at 1059. After the trial court granted the Johnsons' motion, Cryobank 
filed a petition for writ of mandate, which was denied by the California Court of Ap-
peals. Cryobank then petitioned to the California Supreme Court, who granted re-
view. The matter was then remanded back to the California Court of Appeals, and an 
Order to Show Cause was issued. Shortly thereafter, the trial court denied the John-
sons' motion. See id. 
106 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1059. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
12
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and his family's medical history.lo9 The Johnsons then asked 
the trial court to approve this stipulation and enter a protec-
tive order.110 However, John Doe later decided that he did not 
want his deposition taken because he wished to be left 
alone.l11 Additionally, Cryobank objected to the stipulation, 
claiming that John Doe had a right to privacy and was pro-
tected by a physician-patient privilege. 112 The trial court did 
not approve the Johnsons' stipulation regarding John Doe's 
testimony and agreed with Cryobank's objection.113 
The Johnsons served John Doe with a second deposition 
subpoena based upon the prior subpoena served, using John 
Doe's true name, as well as his address and telephone num-
ber.114 This subpoena required John Doe to appear at a deposi-
tion and produce documents pertaining to his medical his-
tory.115 John Doe did not appear at the scheduled deposition.116 
The Johnsons then moved to compel John Doe's compliance 
with the deposition subpoena.ll7 Meanwhile, Cryobank moved 
to quash the same subpoena.118 
The trial court denied the Johnsons' motion to compel 
John Doe's deposition and production of documents.119 The 
court held that John Doe had a privacy interest in keeping 
his identity and personal information confidential. l20 The 
court also held that the information the Johnsons moved to 
compel of John Doe would not provide anything substantial, 
and thus did not outweigh John Doe's privacy interest. l2l 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1059. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. at 1059·1060. See also Return by Answer to Petition for Writ of Man-
date; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4, Johnson v. The 
Superior Court of California, et aI., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1060 (2000) (No. SC 
043434) at pg. 5. 
115 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1059-1060. 
116 See id. at.1060. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. The Johnsons motion to compel the deposition of John Doe was denied 
by the trial court, finding that John Doe had a privacy interest and his right to re-
main anonymous was not outweighed by a compelling state interest. $ee id. 
120 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1060. 
121 See id. 
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The trial court granted Cryobank's motion to quash and 
denied the Johnsons' motion to compel John Doe's compliance 
with the deposition and production subpoena.122 The Johnsons 
then filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel their mo-
tion, and to direct the trial court to vacate its order granting 
Cryobank's motion to quash the deposition subpoena.123 The 
California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Divi-
sion Two, granted the Johnsons' petition for writ of man-
date.124 The Appellate Court held that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the Johnsons' motion to compel John 
Doe's deposition.125 The court ordered the trial court to vacate 
its order denying the Johnsons' motion, as well as the order 
granting Cryobank's motion to quash, instructing the trial 
court to grant the Johnsons' motion to compel.126 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has denied review. 127 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Johnson v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 
the court held that John Doe's privacy interest in keeping his 
identity and medical information confidential was outweighed 
by a compelling state interest in protecting the health and 
medical interests of children conceived through artificial in-
semination.128 In reaching this conclusion, the court examined 
the scope of discovery for civil cases,129 the physician-patient 
privilege,130 third party beneficiary status,131 and the constitu-
tional right to privacy.132 
122 See id. 
123 See Return by Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandate; Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, Johnson v. The Superior Court of Califor-
nia, et aI., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1060 (2000) (No. SC 043434) at 5. 
124 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 106l. 
125 See id. at 1072. 
126 See id. 
127 See Johnson v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, et aI., 2000 Cal. 
LEXIS 6741 (2000). 
126 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1072. 
129 See id. at 1062. See also infra notes 133-146 and accompanying text. 
130 See id. at 1062-1063. See also infra notes 147-155 and accompanying text. 
131 See id. at 1063-1064. See also infra notes 156-164 and accompanying text. 
132 See id. at 1068. See also infra notes 165-207 and accompanying text. 
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A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SCOPE OF DISCOVERY 
The court first considered the discretion of a trial court to 
manage the discovery of its cases.133 The standard of review 
for discovery rulings is one of abuse of discretion.134 Only 
when "no legal justification" exists for a ruling, mayan appel-
late court set aside a trial court's ruling. 13S In Johnson, the 
court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion 
by denying the Johnsons' motion to compel the deposition and 
production of documents of John Doe and granting Cryobank's 
motion to quash. 136 
According to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 
2017,137 the scope of discovery in civil cases is very broad. 138 
Anything may be subject to discovery, so long as it is relevant 
to the subject matter of the pending action and is not privi-
leged.139 The scope of discovery may include the identities of 
persons with knowledge of anything discoverable. 140 The trial 
court limited discovery by denying the Johnsons' motion to 
compel John Doe's deposition and production of documents.141 
The court found that John Doe's identity and medical his-
tory were discoverable because this information was substan-
tially relevant to the negligence cause of action regarding 
Cryobank's screening process. 142 Furthermore, the court con-
cluded that Cryobank's alleged misrepresentation to the John-
sons of the quality of the sperm rendered John Doe's medical 
history discoverable.143 Cryobank argued that any information 
pertaining to Donor 276's identity and medical history was 
privileged based on a physician-patient relationship between 
Cryobank and John Doe.144 Cryobank also argued that John 
133 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1062. 
134 See id. at 1061 (citing Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 
378, 380 (1961)). 
185 See id. at 1062. 
136 See id. at 1072. 
137 See CAL. Cw. PRoc. CODE § 2017 (West 2000). 
138 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1062. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 1061-1062. 
142 See id. at 1062. 
143 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1062. 
144 See id. 
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Doe's deposition should have been precluded because of the 
privacy agreements signed by the parties, and John Doe's con-
stitutional right to privacy.145 However, the court did not 
agree with any of Cryobank's arguments.146 
B. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
Although Cryobank asserted the physician-patient privi-
lege on behalf of John Doe, the court noted that John Doe did 
not have a physician-patient relationship with Cryobank.147 To 
have such a relationship, John Doe would have had to consult 
Cryobank for medical treatment or diagnosis.148 John Doe 
never used Cryobank in this capacity, but rather went to Cry-
obank to sell his sperm.149 Thus, John Doe was not by defini-
tion a patient of Cryobank and would have been unable to as-
sert the physician-patient privilege in any cause of action.150 
Even if a physician-patient relationship existed, only the 
patient may assert such privilege.151 In this case, John Doe 
did not assert this privilege.152 Rather, it was Cryobank that 
did. 153 If, in fact, John Doe had been a patient, he would had 
to have asserted the privilege, because the Johnsons re-
quested his personal information.154 The court held that Cry-
obank, therefore, lacked the right to assert this privilege on 
John Doe's behalf.155 
145 See id. at 1064, 1067-1068. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. at 1062-1063. See also Kizer v. Sulnick, 202 Cal. App. 3d 431, 439 
(1988) (stating that people taking part in a study to determine the cause of similar 
medical ailments in a residential area were not considered "patients"). See also Peo-
ple v. Cabral, 12 Cal. App. 4th 820, 828 (1993) (explaining that to assert the physi-
cian-patient privilege, the medical treatment must be the dominant purpose of the 
treatment). . 
146 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1063. See also CAL. Evm. CODE § 991 (West 
2000). 
149 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1063. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. See also CAL. EVlD. CODE §§ 993-994 (West 2000). 
152 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1063. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
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C. THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY STATUS 
The court next examined the privacy agreements signed 
by all the parties.156 Under California Civil Code Section 1559, 
a contract may benefit and be enforced by a third party.157 
This third party need not be specifically named, but must be-
long to the class that is to benefit from the contract.15S 
John Doe argued that the agreement the Johnsons signed 
prior to receiving sperm from Cryobank, with the intent of 
maintaining the sperm donor's anonymity, established him as 
a third party beneficiary to the contract between the Johnsons 
and Cryobank.159 The agreement was made to benefit him 
and, he argued, prevented the Johnsons from discovering his 
identity.160 The contract contained provisions whereby the 
Johnsons promised to never inquire as to the identity of the 
donor.161 The court agreed that the contract between the John-
sons and Cryobank was designed to protect the confidentiality 
of all of the parties involved.162 Therefore, John Doe was a 
third party beneficiary of this contract.16S The court, however, 
disagreed with John Doe's assertion that this contract prohib-
ited disclosure of his identity under any circumstance. l64 
D. PuBLIC POLICY VS. DONOR'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Although the court decided that John Doe was a third 
party beneficiary to the Johnson-Cryobank contract, it found 
that allowing his status to shield him from disclosing his 
156 See id. at 1064. 
157 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1559 (West 2000). 
158 See Principal Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Vars, Pave, McCord & Freedman, 65 Cal. 
App. 4th 1469, 1485 (1998)(citing Marina Tenants Assn. V. Deauville Marina Devel-
opment Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d 122, 128 (1986)). 
159 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1064. 
160 See id. at 1064-1065. A third party beneficiary of a contract can consist of an 
unnamed class and may be either intended or incidental, and that determination is 
decided by the agreeing parties' intent. In the agreement in the present case, a clear 
intent was expressed that the intent for confidentiality was for all parties to benefit, 
making the anonymous donor an intended beneficiary. See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. at 1065. 
163 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1065. 
164 See id. at 1064. 
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identity violated public policy.165 If an agreement or contract 
contradicts public policy, the contract becomes invalid and un-
enforceable. 166 As a result, the contract between Cryobank and 
the Johnsons was invalid. 167 
According to Family Code Section 7613,168 the paperwork 
regarding an artificial insemination generally remains confi-
dential with the facility and doctor performing the procedure, 
but may be subject to inspection upon a showing of "good 
cause."169 Although case law does not set forth the "good 
cause" requirement, the court yielded to the argument that 
requiring identity disclosure for the purpose of getting poten-
tially helpful medical information constituted a "good cause" 
under the statute.170 The contract between Cryobank and the 
Johnsons contained no provisions allowing for disclosure of 
the donor's identity, and included a provision allowing Cry-
obank to destroy all of the records, which would render disclo-
sure impossible.l7l The contract was therefore contrary to 
statutory authority and violated public policy under Section 
7613.172 The court took special notice, however, that Cryobank 
was aware of the Section 7613 "good cause" provision, includ-
ing a clause in its privacy agreements with donors, including 
John Doe, that explained the possibility of identity 
disclosure. 173 
Because the contract between the Johnsons and Cryobank 
violated public policy, the court had to decide whether John 
Doe's privacy interest in maintaining his anonymity required 
protection from the Johnsons' demand for disclosure, despite 
the invalidity of their contract with Cryobank.174 In order to 
determine whether John Doe's "inalienable" right to privacy 
166 See id. at 1065. 
166 See Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1821, 1825-1826 
(1993). 
167 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1067. 
168 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000). 
169 See id. 
170 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1066-1067. See also Ginsberg, supra note 30, 
at 847-850. See also Swanson, supra note 7, at 183-184. See also Koehler, supra note 
11, at 324-330. 
171 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1064-1065. 
172 See id. at 1066 
173 See id. at 1066-1067. 
174 See id. at 1068. 
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would be violated, the court applied the Hill test. 175 The court 
described the two classes of legally recognized privacy inter-
ests, one involving a person's information, and the other in-
volving a person's autonomy.176 An informational privacy in-
terest is an interest in protecting confidential information, 
while· an autonomy interest is an interest in making individ-
ual, personal choices without outside interference.l77 The Hill 
test applies to both classes of privacy interests.17S Had John 
Doe had any legally protected privacy interests, he would 
have been protected from the Johnsons' discovery demands.179 
An individual's medical history is a legally-protected pri-
vacy interest. ISO Since John Doe's identity was linked to his 
medical history, his identity was a privacy interest. lSI The 
court also decided that the limited disclosure of artificial in-
semination documentation under Section 7613 gave sperm do-
nors a limited privacy interest. IS2 However, the court deter-
mined that Section 7613 limited a sperm donor's legitimate 
expectation of privacy by providing for the possibility of docu-
mentary disclosure of artificial insemination information. ls3 
The disclosure of this information could reasonably include 
the identities of the parties. l84 As a result, the level of privacy 
that may be expected is diminished.185 
The court acknowledged that Cryobank told its donors 
that disclosure of any identifying documentation was highly 
improbable, but disclosure of non-identifying information was. 
possible.186 As a result, Cryobank's sperm donors may have 
175 See id. (citing Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 52-57). 
176 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1068 (citing Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 35). 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1069 (citing Pettus v. Cole, 49 Cal. App. 4th 
402, 440-441 (1996». 
181 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1069. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. Disclosure of otherwise confidential information regarding an artificial 
insemination procedure may occur upon court order with a showing of "good cause." 
When the health and medical treatment of a child conceived through artificial insem-
ination is at stake, "good cause" for disclosure is likely established. See id. 
185 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1069. 
186 See id. 
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reasonably expected their anonymity to remain intact.187 How-
ever, their reasonable expectation of privacy concerning non-
identifying medical information was diminished.188 Mter all, 
Donor 276 submitted 320 sperm specimens to Cryobank over 
the course of five years, which were used by an unknown 
number of Cryobank clients, creating a commercial relation-
ship between Donor 276 and Cryobank.189 These facts led the 
court to conclude that Donor 276's relationship with Cryobank 
possibly affected many people. 190 The court held that, based 
on these circumstances, Donor 276 could not reasonably ex-
pect that his privacy would be maintained because his expec-
tation of privacy had been diminished by his relationship with 
Cryobank.191 
Although the court held that John Doe's privacy interest 
in maintaining his anonymity was diminished by his fruitful 
commercial relationship with Cryobank, John Doe argued that 
to disclose the information would nevertheless constitute a se-
rious invasion of privacy.192 As the information sought ex-
tended to the donor's family, the court agreed that the disclo-
sure of medical history of John Doe's family created the 
possibility of a serious invasion of privacy.193 In determining 
whether to protect this information, the court weighed the im-
pact of this invasion against the other interests involved.194 
In this case, because the disclosure had been court or-
dered, a state action was involved.195 In order to override the 
constitutional right to privacy, a court must find a compelling 
state interest to do SO.196 The court held that the State had 
several such interests. 197 First, the State has a compelling in-
terest in maintaining compliance with discovery subpoenas.198 
Second, the State has a compelling interest in keeping court 
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
190 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1069-1070. 
191 See id. at 1070. 
192 See id. at 1070. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. at 1071. 
195 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1071. 
196 See id. at 1071. 
197 See id. 
198 See id. 
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proceedings truthful.199 Third, allowing those who are injured 
complete redressability is a compelling interest.2oo Although 
the court considered these interests against John Doe's right 
to privacy, the court focused on a fourth state interest in its 
analysis.201 
In addition to the aforementioned state interests, the 
court also determined that the State had a compelling inter-
est in protecting the health and welfare of children conceived 
through artificial insemination.202 The court then acknowl-
edged that occasionally it becomes necessary for individuals 
that have used artificial insemination to obtain information 
regarding the biological and genetic backgrounds of their chil-
dren.203 For some, this information can mean the difference 
between life and death.204 For this reason, the court deter-
mined that the parties must have avenues to uncover the oth-
erwise confidential documentation regarding artificial insemi-
nation procedures. 205 As a result of the compelling state 
interest in protecting the health and welfare of Brittany, as 
well as that of all children conceived through anonymous do-
nor artificial insemination, the court determined that the trial 
court's denial of the Johnsons' motion to compel was an abuse 
of discretion and vacated its order.206 Based on its findings, 
the court ordered that the case be remanded to the trial 
court, with directions to grant the Johnsons' motion to compel 
and order the deposition and production of documents from 
John Doe, limited to information necessary and relevant to 
the litigation.207 
199 See id. 
200 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1071. 
201 See id. 
202 See id. at 1071-1072 (citing Mansfield v. Hyde, 112 Cal. App. 2d 133, 139 
(1952) (stating the State has a continuous interest in protecting the welfare of 
children». 
203 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1071. 
204 See id. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. at 1072. 
207 See id. 
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V. CRITIQUE 
The Johnson court's decision will have major conse-
quences on the anonymity aspects of the artificial insemina-
tion industry. Furthermore, this decision will serve as a re-
minder that in an era of technological advancements, a 
priority must still be placed on the health and safety of chil-
dren. While the secrecy surrounding the artificial insemina-
tion process can seem insurmountable to a parent or child in 
need of an anonymous sperm donor's medical history, the 
Johnson decision will ease the struggle of those in need of 
this information by creating an avenue for access.208 
A. THE COURT'S DECISION 
The court in Johnson correctly decided that a parent's in-
terests in obtaining private information about a sperm donor 
are more compelling than the privacy rights of that donor. 209 
Although the Johnson court decided a novel issue, the di-
lemma is not startling, considering the fact that more than 
30,000 children are conceived through artificial insemination 
each year.210 As this number of children continues to grow, the 
potential for genetically-based medical problems similar to 
those faced by Brittany also increases. 211 
The court created precedent with this decision. Prior to 
this decision, no California cases interpreted the "good cause" 
requirement for the release of artificial insemination docu-
ments in California Family Code Section 7316. By decidirig 
that Brittany's need for medical information regarding John 
Doe constituted "good cause," the court set a standard for 
plaintiffs' right to information regarding artificial 
insemination. 
In reaching its decision, the court considered the privacy 
interests of the donor. Although it demanded that the trial 
court compel John Doe's deposition and production of docu-
ments, the court also demanded that this disclosure be made 
with the fullest possible protection of John Doe's identity, as 
WS See Edelman, supra note 14, at AI. 
209 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1072. 
210 See Ginsberg, supra note 32, at 826. 
21l See Ted Appel, Woman Files Suit to Know Name of Sperm Donor, UNITED 
PREss INTERNATIONAL. September 24, 1987, at DL 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss2/4
2001] SPERM DONATION 215 
well as that of his family members.212 The court was careful in 
trying to accommodate the interests of all parties by giving 
the Johnsons the ability to obtain information regarding John 
Doe, while not forcing him to completely give up his anonym-
ity.213 However, this decision undermines the long-held posi-
tion of the artificial insemination industry that information 
about donors should never be available. 214 This result, al-
though potentially harmful to the artificial insemination in-
dustry, was correct because the interests the parties involved 
were properly balanced. 
B. RIGHTS TO ANONYMITY V. NECESSITY OF DISCLOSURE 
In Johnson, both the Johnsons and Donor 276 signed 
agreements that stated that the donor's identity would remain 
anonymous.215 Because of Cryobank's assurances, the John-
sons did not consider that the sperm they received could have 
any defect.216 Cryobank's negligence caused the Johnsons to 
conceive a child with a genetically transmitted disease.217 
Under general guidelines set for sperm donors, Cryobank, one 
of the largest sperm banks in the country,218 should have de-
tected Donor 276's genetic history and eliminated him as a 
donor.219 When problems like this occur, the children born 
through artificial insemination should not have to pay the 
price when they require information about the donors used to 
conceive them. The fact that artificial insemination requires 
an anonymous third party to become part of the reproduction 
process creates the potential for problems should the resulting 
child develop medical problems. 
Anonymity and secrecy are long-held requirements of the 
212 See Johnson, SO Cal. App. 4th at 1072. 
213 See id. 
214 See McNulty, supra note 4, at l. 
215 See Johnson, SO Cal. App. 4th at 1056-105S. 
216 See id. at 1056. 
217 See id. 
218 See Squires, supra note 2S, at 9. 
219 See Johnson, SO Cal. App. 4th at 1056-1057. See also Autosomal Dominant 
Polycystic Kidney Disease Knowledge Base (visited September 26, 2000) <http:// 
www.cimr.cam.ac.uklmedgen/pkdldefault.htm>. Approximately one in every SOO peo-
ple is aft1icted with ADPK. See id. See also Milutinovic, supra note S4. 
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artificial insemination process.220 The necessity of this secrecy 
is rarely questioned.221 In a situation like that faced by the 
Johnsons, the need for such a shroud of secrecy becomes 
blurred because of the child's need for information regarding 
her biological origins.222 Under their agreement, the Johnsons 
had the same right to maintain anonymity as Donor 276.223 
However, they revealed themselves to uncover information 
they believed was necessary for their child's well being.224 Al-
though an anonymous donor may expect the agreed to privacy 
after donation, he should not expect that his anonymity will 
be protected at all costs. 
Few question the reasons why a donor would require such 
anonymity protection. A donor has sold his sperm, and, there-
fore, his genetic make-up, in the likelihood that it will be 
used to conceive children.225 Mter screening, once a man is se-
lected as a sperm donor, a sperm bank will contract with the 
donor only if the donor agrees to make constant and continu-
ous donations. Donor 276 had donated 320 sperm specimens 
to Cryobank,226 which means that he could have fathered as 
many children. After he was informed that he could no longer 
be a donor because of his genetically-transmitted disease, Cry-
obank should have made him aware that children conceived 
with his sperm could have been born with a disease he gave 
them, and disclosure of information about him might be 
necessary. 
C. THE CHILD'S RIGHT TO KNow 
Despite the sperm bank industry's concerns that the pos-
sibility of identity disclosure will lead to fewer donors, chil-
dren born through artificial insemination must have access to 
information about the donors used to conceive them. If a 
child, like Brittany, is diagnosed with a genetic disease trace-
able only to the sperm that aided in her creation, that child 
must have an avenue to uncover information that may deter-
220 See Edelman, supra note 14, at AI. 
221 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 154. 
222 See McNulty, supra note 4, at 1. 
223 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1056. 
224 See id. at 1056-1057. 
225 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 151-152. 
226 See Johnson; 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1058. 
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mine a course of treatment and ultimately impact her health. 
Children born through artificial insemination may suffer from 
specific medical conditions, such as cancer, that are more cur-
able through early detection.227 Knowledge of a genetic predis-
position to such a disease could make a huge difference in the 
rate of the child's recovery.228 Even if only a small chance ex-
ists that this information could help the child, access to infor-
mation should be available.229 
The tensions between donor and child expressed in John-
son are similar to those that arise in the area of closed adop-
tions.23o In a closed adoption, records regarding the identities 
of the parties are sealed, making access to necessary medical 
information very difficult.231 Groups battling between open 
and closed adoptions have many of the same concerns that 
plague those involved with artificial insemination, such as the 
right to remain anonymous, and the medical necessity of re-
leasing identifying information.232 As a result of problems 
caused by closed adoptions, some states require all adoption 
records to be open.233 Medical necessity of adoptees, an analo-
gous problem to that faced by Brittany in Johnson, is an area 
of concern that has contributed to the shift from closed to 
open adoptions.234 However, the main difference between the 
anonymity requirements of artificial insemination and adop-
tion, however, is the expressed sentiment of those favoring 
open adoption that adopted children should be allowed to 
know their biological heritage and that the denial of such in-
formation can be detrimental to these children.235 This posi-
tion is not highly promoted in the area of artificial insemina-
tion, but the decision in Johnson is a step towards 
ameliorating this problem. 
227 See Swanson, supra note 8, at 174. 
228 See id. 
229 See id. at 174-175. 
230 See McNulty, supra note 4, at 1. 
231 See id. 
232 See id. 
233 See David E. Rovella, Parental Right Not to be Found, THE NATIONAL LAw 
JOURNAL, November 16, 1998, at A7. Four states currently have laws requiring all 
adoption records be open; Alaska, Kansas, Tennessee and Oregon. See id. 
234 See Deborah McAlister, Hidden Histories: Adoptees in Texas Can't Answer Key 
genetic Questions, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, August 23, 1998, at 6J. 
235 See McNulty, supra note 4, at 1. See also Rovella, supra note 232, at A7. 
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The court points out that the privacy agreements signed 
by the Johnsons violated public and statutory policy.236 The 
statutory provision in Family Code Section 7613, which allows 
for the inspection of artificial insemination records, prevents 
poor record keeping of artificial insemination procedures.237 
Despite Section 7613, the general practice of most sperm 
banks is to destroy all documentation so that identification of 
a specific donor continues to be extremely difficult, if not im-
possible.238 This practice violates the rights of children born 
through artificial insemination by destroying identifying infor-
mation that the children may have "good cause" to access. 
However, as a result of the Johnson decision, these children, 
and their parents, are now able to go to court to demand 
identifying information about their donors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The court in the Johnson case properly decided that the 
state's interest in protecting the health of a child created by 
artificial insemination is more compelling than maintaining 
the privacy and anonymity of a sperm donor. Allowing for the 
discovery of a donor who wished to stay anonymous does not 
violate the privacy rights of that donor. This case will cause 
sperm banks to more carefully screen potential donors and to 
increasingly question the practice of strict anonymity in artifi-
cial insemination procedures, especially as society becomes 
more aware of the importance of genetics in determining our 
own individual health. 
Jenna H. Bauman * 
236 See Johnson, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1065. 
237 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2000). See also Swanson, supra note 8, at 
154. 
238 See McNulty, supra note 4, at 1. See also Rubin, supra note 11, at 1. 
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